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THE IMPLICATIONS OF CREATING AN IPHONE BACKDOOR

GREGORY CouTRos*

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's request that Apple provide an electronic backdoor into
the iPhone left behind by one of the San Bernardino shooters is a reasonable, albeit difficult, request.
It makes sense that the government would ask the company that created iOS to be the one to provide
a backdoor into the device, as it is most readily able to do so. 1 The government argued that accessing
the phone was important to discover who the shooters had been working and communicating with
in order to protect against the possibility of similar terror attacks. 2 However, creating a backdoor into
the iPhone sets a dangerous precedent and creates a powerful technological tool. 3
Destroying something once created in cyberspace is nearly impossible. 4 The FBI argued that
it was only requesting access to a single phone; the Bureau did not want nor expected Apple to create
a backdoor to all iPhones. 5 However, Apple pointed out a flaw in the FBI's argument-because the
process used to create the backdoor "could be replicated[,]" the code "would not be truly destroyed"
even if Apple nominally did so after its intended use. 6 Meaning, the code creating a backdoor could
be reproduced and applied to other mobile devices. This would eliminate any security measure the
original operating system had in place for any phone that uses the same operating system.7 The
code used to create the backdoor would result in a skeleton key that could prove to be a major cyber
security threat. 8
Because of the nature of the Intelligence world, the information on the phone could be
more valuable than protecting against a potential cyber security threat against an aging Operating
System. Gaining access to the iPhone would provide the Intelligence Community with names
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and communications; from there, the possibility exists to discover other possible terrorist links.
Additionally, should a precedent be set, whenever a phone or similar device is discovered, Apple
would have a hard time arguing that the phone should not be unlocked. 9 In the context of
intelligence gathering, any information gathered by law enforcement could prove to be the one
missing piece of a puzzle. Therefore, the faster a law enforcement agency is able to gain access to a
device, the faster intelligence can be gathered and analyzed.
Information in the Intelligence Community is passed from agency to agency in a way that is
designed to help piece together information and form a picture of what is happening. 1° For instance,
the "FBI can share information with ... the CIA,'' because one agency has information that the
other needs. 11 This flow of information can be used to help create a clearer picture of a potential
threat. By gaining access to the content (rather than just the metadata) of the San Bernardino
shooter's phone, the FBI could potentially determine how the attack was orchestrated and who else
was involved. 12 With access to this valuable information, the FBI and other agencies could work to
prevent the terrorist network involved with the shooting from carrying out another similar attack.
Unfortunately, the FBI's approach could set a dangerous precedent that affects privacy rights for the
sake of only potentially stopping a threat. 13
This is a fight that has already started to play out in court. 14 In the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, Judge Pym ordered Apple to create new software to
unlock the phone. 15 However, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York Judge Orenstein refused to require Apple to do the same with the phone of a drug dealer. 16
Despite these conflicting rulings, it appears for now that the issue in the San Bernardino attack is on
hold. The FBI recently requested to have the case dropped because the FBI discovered a way into the
phone. 17 The court approved their request.
Currently, there is a Manhattan prosecutor waiting to learn how the iPhone case will play
out because he has 175 locked iPhones that are presently inaccessible. 18 Although it appears as
though that prosecutor's efforts have been frustrated for the moment, the hypothetical persists-if
a court finds that Apple is required to create this backdoor for the FBI, prosecutors around the
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country will begin to follow suit. Every prosecutor in the country who stumbles upon a cellphone
in the possession of a suspect could request the contents of the phone be provided by citing to the
Apple case. 19 Even if there is no guarantee that the content on the phone is crucial to the case, the
argument could be made that the intelligence value of the information will justify the request.
Creating a backdoor is dangerous. 20 It creates a slippery slope, both technologically and
legally. A legal precedent would be set that could make it easy to access the contents of a suspect's
phone, which would potentially alter privacy rights related to cellphones. In terms of technology, a
skeleton key that could potentially be used to access anything that runs the same operating system
would be created. No one would argue that trying to prevent another San Bernardino-type attack is
not important, but is it important enough to allow for the creation of a skeleton key or a dangerous
precedent? No, it is not. In the current interconnected landscape of society, the modicum of privacy
that still exists is vital. To remove another safeguard could be disastrous.
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